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CITIZENS UNITED AND TAXABLE ENTITIES:   
WILL TAXABLE ENTITIES BE THE NEW 
STEALTH DARK MONEY CAMPAIGN 
ORGANIZATIONS? 
Donald B. Tobin∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The electoral process in the United States is going through a major 
transition as money increasingly pours into non-candidate independent 
groups (“IGs”).  The Center for Responsive Politics estimates that over 
$300 million flowed into IGs involved in elections in the 2012 election 
cycle.1  Before 2000, IGs could engage in significant electoral advocacy 
without having to disclose the IG’s donors or its expenditures.2  In 2000, 
Congress sought to address the lack of disclosure by requiring political 
organizations to disclose their contributions and expenditures.3  IGs 
quickly sought an alternative organizational form for engaging in 
political advocacy.  For the most part, the organizational form of choice 
                                                 
∗ Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  
This Lecture is an update of a previous Article, written in 2007, on taxable entities and 
campaign finance.  Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities:  Are They the 
Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41 (2007).  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a brief update was warranted.  558 U.S. 310, 
372 (2010).  The author wishes to thank David Herzig, Brian Hellwig, Gregg Polsky, Ellen 
Aprill, Brian Galle, the Valparaiso Law Review, and the participants in the South East 
Association of Law School’s tax discussion group. 
1 Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/M6YV-V3AC. 
2 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976) (per curium).  Before 2001, IGs that were not 
classified as political action committees were only required to disclose if they engaged in 
“express advocacy.”  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court limited several provisions contained in 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).  Id.  The Court determined that only 
communication that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate would be 
subject to regulation.  Id.  In many cases, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
regulations required groups to disclose that they purchased a particular advertisement.  See 
47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2013) (showing regulations for radio advertisements); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 76.1715 (2013) (showing regulations for television advertisements); 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) 
(2012) (illustrating the requirements for types of sponsorship information).  These 
disclosures, however, usually only required the name of the organizations, which could be 
created specifically for the purpose of the advertisement.  See Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay 
on Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) 
(providing discussion on pre-2000 law of disclosure and IGs); Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous 
Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 612–13 (2003) 
(continuing discussion on the provisions requiring disclosure of campaign contributions or 
expenditures) [hereinafter Anonymous Speech and Section 527]. 
3 Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000). 
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has been designated as a social welfare organization under section 
501(c)(4) of the Code.4 
Section 501(c)(4) organizations, however, are not supposed to be 
campaign organizations.5  They are allowed to engage in some political 
activity, but the groups’ primary purpose must be social welfare 
activity.6  If Congress or the Internal Revenue Service (“Service") clamps 
down on recent abuses, section 501(c)(4) status may be an imperfect 
alternative form for avoiding section 527’s disclosure provisions.7  
Moreover, recent proposed regulations by the Treasury, seeking to create 
clear rules for social welfare organizations, might limit the attractiveness 
of social welfare organizations and campaign vehicles.8  If social welfare 
organizations become less attractive entities, IGs may look to taxable 
organizations, which have significantly less regulation, as alternative 
campaign vehicles. 
In a 2007 article, I explored whether tax-exempt entities would be the 
next loophole used by IGs to avoid disclosure of contributions and 
expenditures.9  I concluded that in most cases taxable entities would not 
be an attractive vehicle because there would be significant tax 
implications if an entity forwent tax-exempt status, and because taxable 
corporations were prohibited from expressly advocating the election or 
defeat of a candidate.10  The Supreme Court, however, overturned the 
ban on independent corporate spending in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.11  Post Citizens United, taxable entities are now a far 
more attractive vehicle for campaign activity than they were in 2007. 
Social welfare organizations and other tax-exempt entities are now 
subject to increased scrutiny.  There have been calls for increased 
                                                 
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2013). 
5 Id. at § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). 
6 Id. 
7 Short term, it does not appear that either Congress, the Treasury, or the Service will 
provide for further regulation of social welfare organizations.  The Treasury recently 
proposed further rulemaking.  Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on 
Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013).  After 
receiving over 150,000 comments, the Service noted that it would likely make revisions to 
the proposed rule and seek further comment.  IRS Update on the Proposed New-Regulation on 
501(c)(4) Organizations, IRS.GOV (May 22, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-
Update-on-the-Proposed-New-Regulation-on-501(c)(4)-Organizations, archived at 
http://perma.cc/KG7C-J6NR?type=source. 
8 See 78 Fed. Reg. 71535 (expressing the guidelines of contributions from section 501(c) 
organizations); supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of clear 
orders for social welfare organizations). 
9 Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities:  Are They the Next “Loophole”?, 
6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 42 (2007) [hereinafter Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities]. 
10 Id. at 99. 
11 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2009). 
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enforcement of the existing rules regulating tax-exempt organizations 
involved in election related activities.12  In the campaign finance arena, 
further regulation in one area often entices entities to conduct activities 
in another.  As Congress and the Service consider further regulation of 
social welfare groups, they must also consider whether further 
regulation of tax-exempt organizations will encourage IGs to reorganize 
as taxable organizations.  This Lecture discusses whether taxable entities 
will be attractive vehicles for IGs interested in avoiding broad based 
disclosure. 
Since taxable entities are subject to less regulation, they will be 
attractive vehicles as long as the tax consequences to the IGs do not 
outweigh the economic and regulatory benefits of forgoing tax-exempt 
status.  The key question is a tax question, not an election law question:  
can taxable entities engage in campaign activity without incurring 
significant tax liability? 
II.  CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Currently, most IGs organize as tax-exempt organizations under 
either section 501(c) or section 527 of the Code.13  Section 527 was 
specifically created as the organizational structure for political 
organizations.14  Section 527 organizations are tax-exempt, donors to 
section 527 organizations are not subject to the gift tax, contributions to 
the organization are not tax deductible, and the organization must 
disclose its donors and its expenditures.15  Section 501(c)(3) charitable 
organizations are exempt from tax, they are prohibited from intervening 
in a political campaign for or against a candidate for public office, and 
contributions to the organization are tax deductible.16  Other 501(c) 
organizations operate in the space between these two organizations.  For 
the most part, these organizations are not subject to tax on income 
related to the organizations’ purpose and are not subject to public 
disclosure obligations with regard to contributions to organizations or 
                                                 
12 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing tax-exempt organizations’ 
permissible involvement in election activities). 
13 See generally I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012) (detailing the list of exempt organizations); id. 
§ 527(a) (2012) (defining political organization). 
14 See Pub. L. No. 93-625, § 10(a), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (amending Section 527 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and providing a specific tax exempt category for Political 
Organizations in 1975). 
15 See I.R.C. §§ 527(c)(3), (f)(1) (2012) (exempting contributions to political organizations 
from gift tax); id. § 2501(a)(4) (exempting transfers of money or other personal property to 
political organizations from gift tax). 
16 See id. §§ 170(a)(1), (b)(A)(vi) (explaining the allowance of deductions for charitable 
contributions and gifts); id. § 501(c)(3) (explaining the exemption from tax). 
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expenditures of organizations.17  Tax-exempt organizations that are not 
organized under section 527, however, must have a primary purpose 
that does not involve intervening in candidate elections.18 
In previous work, I have argued that the section 527 disclosure 
provisions apply to all organizations, including taxable ones that have as 
their primary purpose the election or defeat of a candidate for public 
office.19  To date, however, there have been no cases considering the 
reach of section 527s disclosure provisions.20  Moreover, in light of the 
Service’s reluctance to aggressively enforce existing provisions, it is 
questionable whether taxable entities will be subject to section 527’s 
disclosure provisions even if the organizations have as their primary 
purpose engaging in election advocacy.21 
If section 527 does not apply to taxable entities, or taxable entities 
avoid engaging in electoral advocacy on behalf of a candidate as their 
primary purpose, a taxable entity could engage in non-coordinated 
electoral advocacy without having to disclose contributions to the 
organization or expenditures of the organization.  To the extent the 
organization engaged in electioneering communication or express 
advocacy, the entity might be subject to regulation under FECA, but 
even in those instances the organization would likely not be subject to 
donor disclosure.22 
Thus, absent tax consequences, taxable entities allow organizations 
to avoid serious disclosure.  Moreover, taxable entities are also not 
                                                 
17 See id. § 501(c)(4)(A) (discussing social welfare organizations); id. § 501(c)(5) 
(composing the wording for labor unions); I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (providing language for 
business leagues).  These organizations are still subject to disclosure under FECA, but these 
organizations can very easily avoid donor disclosure under election law.  Donald Tobin, 
Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities:  A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 
ELECTION L. J. 427, 427 (2011) (stating that many IGs have figured out how to manipulate 
the tax classification). 
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2013). 
19 See Anonymous Speech and Section 527, supra note 2, at 619 (establishing that section 527 
does not apply to all political organizations). 
20 See I.R.C. § 527(j)(2) (2012) (explaining required disclosures of expenditures and 
contributions). 
21 See id. § 527(a) (stating a political organization is subject to tax, and although the 
primary purpose test requires express advocacy, IRC section 527 does not). 
22 See Electioneering Communication, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899, 72911 (Dec. 26, 2007) (codified 
at 11 CFR Part 104, 114) (analyzing electioneering communications).  The FEC has 
determined that donations to a social welfare organization only need to be disclosed if the 
donation was made for the purpose of electioneering communication.  Id.  Donors can 
avoid disclosure easily by not designating the payment for a specific communication.  Id. 
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subject to initial review by the Service nor are they subject to public 
disclosure of their tax returns.23 
III.  TAX LIABILITY 
If tax-exempt entities are subject to robust disclosure provisions and 
taxable entities are not, taxable entities may become very attractive 
vehicles for IGs seeking to engage in election advocacy without being 
subject to a disclosure regime.  In the past, the two main hurdles for 
using taxable entities were: (1) the ban on corporate spending on 
electioneering activity; and (2) the fear that there would be significant tax 
consequences if an entity organized as a taxable organization.24 
In theory, a taxable organization engaged in campaign advocacy 
would have little to no income.  A taxable campaign organization would 
not make a profit and its business deductions would offset any income 
the organization received.  For example, if contributions to the 
organization were considered income, that income would be offset by 
deductions the organization would claim for advertising and wages.  
The costs of advocacy would generally be similar to the contributions 
received and the organization, therefore, would have no net income. 
Congress, however, has sought to equalize the tax treatment 
associated with electioneering activity.  When citizens participate in the 
electoral process by making contributions, they do so out of post-tax 
dollars.25  Political contributions are not tax deductible.26  Congress 
sought to ensure a similar treatment for taxable entities, and taxable 
entities are therefore prohibited from deducting political expenditures as 
business expenses.27  Thus, if contributions to a taxable IG are considered 
income, the taxable IG will incur significant tax liability.  If, however, the 
contributions are not considered income, the taxable IG will have no 
taxable income and therefore no tax liability. 
                                                 
23 See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2012) (providing tax-exempt entities are required to file Form 
990 information returns, which are available to the public); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6033-2(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(i) (2014) (providing every organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a) 
shall file an annual information return). 
24 See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 99 (establishing the hurdles 
for using taxable entities). 
25 See id. at 76 (referring to the post-tax dollar payments that individuals make to 
political organizations). 
26 See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012) (outlining instances when a deduction is not allowed). 
27 Id. § 162(e)(4)(A) (prohibiting deductions for political expenditures, and defining 
influencing legislation as “any attempt to influence any legislation through communication 
with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or 
employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation”). 
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In my 2007 Article, I reviewed the history of the taxation of political 
organizations and traced the theoretical basis for determining whether 
contributions to political organizations are subject to tax.28  There are 
several tax theories, including a conduit theory, a capital contribution 
theory, and a gift theory “that could potentially be used to argue that 
payments received by taxable IGs should not constitute [gross] income to 
the organizations.”29  In my previous work, I rejected the conduit theory 
as being applicable here but determined that the capital contribution 
theory, while very questionable, might provide the basis for exclusion.30  
I ultimately concluded that these payments are best classified as gifts to 
the IG.31  As gifts, the payments would not be taxable to the IG, but in 
most cases, the gifts would be subject to gift tax.32  Legal and political 
developments since 2007 raise the specter that taxable entities could 
avoid tax by arguing that payments are contributions to capital.  While 
less likely, taxable entities might even be able to argue that the payments 
are not income because they are gifts, but are also not subject to gift tax. 
A. Conduit Theory 
Under the conduit theory, “payments to IGs are not considered 
income because the organizations are merely acting as conduits for 
spending that a [contributor] could have made by herself.”33  In some 
cases, the Service appears to use a pooling rationale when applying the 
conduit theory and in others a trust rationale.34  In both situations, the 
basic idea is that the contribution is not income because the organization 
acts as merely an aggregator of the individual payments.35 
Professors Gregg Polsky and Guy-Uriel E. Charles rely on the 
pooling theory to argue that contributions to political organizations 
should not be considered income to the organization.36  They note that 
there would be no tax implications if neighbors joined together to build a 
fence because it would simply be a pooling of funds.37  They argue that 
                                                 
28 See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 44–45 (discussing taxation of 
political organizations and the theories of whether contributions are taxable). 
29 Id. at 75. 
30 See id. at 79 (rejecting the conduit theory). 
31 See id. at 98 (concluding that contributions to IGs will be treated as gifts). 
32 See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating gross income does not include gifts). 
33 See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 75–76 (explaining the conduit 
theory). 
34 See id. at 80–81 (exhibiting the pooling rationale and trust rationale of the conduit 
theory). 
35 See Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1015–16 (2005) (explaining why contribution is not income). 
36 Id. at 1016. 
37 Id. 
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neighbors joining together to support a political cause should not be 
treated differently.38  If the Polsky-Charles rationale was applied to 
contributions to taxable organizations, then the organization’s 
contributions would not be subject to tax.39 
I am skeptical of the pooling rationale because the theory applies 
when the joint activity is taking the place of what an individual could do 
on her own if she joined together with others.  In the fence example, the 
entity is created to pool money and paint the fence.40  The entity only 
serves to aggregate the payments.41  The project itself is controlled by the 
individual members of the community.  In the fence example used by 
Professors Polsky and Charles, the entity itself is just created to pool the 
money.42  The neighbors have decided upon the project, and the person 
or persons who control the entity serve only an administrative 
function.43  The organization itself had no real function but to act as a 
conduit for the contributors.44  Campaign entities are not simply 
conduits for contributors.  The entity, through its management, makes 
significant decisions regarding the organization’s direction.  For 
example, the entity’s management might decide the content of 
advertisements, the strategy of a campaign, the amounts spent on 
various candidates, and even which candidates are worthy of support. 
The pooling theory, however, may provide a rationale to aggressive 
organizations seeking to organize as taxable political campaign entities.  
If the pooling theory applies, the organization would not be required to 
include contributions to the organization as income under general 
income tax principles. 
B. Capital Contribution Theory 
A second possibility for excluding contributions from taxable income 
would be to structure the contributions to the entity as contributions to 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (explaining Professors Polsky and Charles’s rationale).  Proponents of the pooling 
theory also note that the Service does not tax social clubs because of the conduit theory.  
The Joint Committee indicated that “the organization merely facilitates a joint activity of its 
members.”  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., REP. ON HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND 
OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28 (2005) (referencing S. Rep. No. 91-522, at 71 (1969)), 
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NT5J-WUEG. 
40 See Polsky, supra note 35, at 1016 (explaining the fence example). 
41 See id. (describing the aggregation of funds in the fence example). 
42 See id. (showing that the entity is merely created to pool funds). 
43 See id. (reiterating Professors Polsky and Charles’s fence scenario). 
44 See id. (discussing pooling and the conduit theory). 
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capital.45  In most cases, contributions to capital are not considered 
income to the recipient organization.46  In my previous work, I outlined 
the difficulties with treating the contributions as contributions to 
capital.47  To be considered a contribution to capital, either the 
contributor would have to receive something real in exchange for the 
contribution, or the contribution would have to qualify as a non-
shareholder contribution to capital.48 
Treating contributions to the taxable entity as contributions to capital 
likely provides the best opportunity for taxable entities to avoid tax 
liability on the contribution.  The idea is that the contributor would 
receive some type of ownership interest in the taxable entity in exchange 
for the contribution.  For example, suppose a group of wealthy 
individuals want to form an IG to engage in political advocacy.  The IG 
provides that for $1,000,000, a contributor will receive a percentage 
ownership in the IG.  The contributor might also receive voting rights 
and some type of dissolution rights.  The $1,000,000 would then possibly 
be treated as a contribution to capital and the contribution could remain 
anonymous.49 
Section 118 also provides some opportunities for non-shareholder 
contributions to capital.50  The regulation implies that this is a very 
limited exclusion.51  Before passage of section 118, the Court has set out a 
                                                 
45 See Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 81 (explaining the capital 
contribution theory). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 82 (outlining the five part test used for contributions to capital). 
48 See I.R.C. § 118(a) (2012) (“In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include 
any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2014) (explaining 
the general rules and requirements for contributions to the capital of a corporation). 
49 Lots of issues are raised by the use of the contribution to capital theory and they are 
outside the scope of this Lecture.  For example, would this be considered a private 
offering?  Would the advertisements be subject to securities regulations?  Could the 
organization limit this problem by limiting the number of investors and then joining with 
other corporations to engage in the activity? 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (2014). 
51 See id. (quoting language from the regulation).  § 1.118-1 reads: 
Section 118 also applies to contributions to capital made by persons 
other than shareholders.  For example, the exclusion applies to the 
value of land or other property contributed to a corporation by a 
governmental unit or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the 
corporation to locate its business in a particular community, or for the 
purpose of enabling the corporation to expand its operating facilities.  
However, the exclusion does not apply to any money or property 
transferred to the corporation in consideration for goods or services 
rendered, or to subsidies paid for the purpose of inducing the taxpayer 
to limit production. 
Id. 
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five-part test for determining whether a payment by a non-shareholder is 
a contribution to capital:  (1) the payment must be a permanent part of 
the working capital structure; (2) it must not be compensation; (3) it must 
be bargained for; (4) it must result in a “benefit to the transferee in an 
amount commensurate with its value”; and (5) the asset will ordinarily 
contribute to the production of additional income.52 
This test has not been applied in a situation similar to that here and it 
is difficult to determine exactly how a non-shareholder contribution 
would be treated.  It is likely, however, that a payment to an IG would 
fail this test.  These payments are not a permanent part of an 
organization’s working capital.  The payments may even be classified as 
a payment for services since the IG may be deemed to perform a service 
for the payment.  The payments also do not contribute to the production 
of income for the organization.  The non-shareholder contribution to 
capital also is vulnerable to a sham transaction analysis by the Service.53  
Another theory that has been mentioned previously is the gift theory, 
which would make contributions to the entity considered a gift and 
therefore the IG would not have to include the contribution in income.54 
C. Gift Theory 
If contributions to the taxable entity are considered a gift, the taxable 
entity will not have to include the contribution in income.55  While 
taxable entities are not usually thought of as the recipient of gifts, there is 
nothing in section 102 that prohibits a taxable entity from receiving a 
gift.56  If the contribution is considered a gift, there is a separate issue 
whether the contributor would be subject to gift tax on the contribution. 
                                                 
52 Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 82.  This test is principally 
employed when government or nonprofit entities make contributions to a corporation’s 
capital.  See United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401, 413–14 
(1973) (explaining when assets are considered contributions to capital); JACOB MERTENS, JR., 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 38–29 (2006) (discussing when government or 
nonprofit entities make contributions to a corporation’s capital). 
53 A sham transaction is “[a]n agreement or exchange that has no independent economic 
benefit or business purpose and is entered into solely to create a tax advantage (such as a 
deduction for a business loss).  The Internal Revenue Service is entitled to ignore the 
purported tax benefits of a sham transaction.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (10th ed. 
2014). 
54  See infra Part III.C (introducing gift theory). 
55 I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
56 See generally id. § 102 (explaining gifts and inheritances). 
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There are two different tests for determining whether a contribution 
is a gift for income tax and for gift tax purposes.57  The contribution to 
the taxable entity will be considered a gift if it is made with detached 
and disinterested generosity.58  A donor will be subject to gift tax if it is 
made for money or money’s worth.59  Therefore, although it does not 
really make sense in this context, it is possible for a contribution to be 
considered a gift for income tax purposes and not for gift tax purposes.  
If the contribution is considered a gift for both income and gift tax 
purposes, the donor will likely be subject to gift tax on the contribution. 
Contributions to taxable organizations appear to be gifts under the 
standard definition.  The contributions are made to further the general 
ideals of the organization, in a way that is similar to when a donor makes 
a contribution to a charity.60  The donor in the charitable context gets 
some type of intangible benefit, but the Service has usually found these 
types of intangible benefits insufficient to defeat a contribution to a 
charity.61  If the contributions are gifts under section 102 of the Code, the 
recipient organization does not have to include the gift in income.62 
Payments to taxable organizations, however, may not be considered 
gifts if the courts determine that the contributor has received something 
of value in exchange for the payment.63  For example, in Stern v. United 
States, a wealthy investor made large contributions to an organization 
that was fighting political corruption in Louisiana.64  Stern believed the 
                                                 
57 See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1960) (outlining the test regarding 
“disinterested generosity”); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (2013) (outlining the value of 
property test). 
58 See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285–86 (illustrating one of the tests for contribution to a 
taxable entity through disinterested generosity). 
59 See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2012) (providing that a gift is made when property is transferred 
for less than adequate consideration in money or money’s worth); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 
(2013) (determining that there is a gift when the “value of property transferred by the 
donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the consideration given”). 
60 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 6812121000A (Dec. 12, 1968) (“[t]o illustrate, when an 
exempt organization like the Cancer Fund receives a voluntary contribution . . . the Service 
would not argue that this contribution was anything but a voluntary payment of 
something for nothing . . . ”); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (2014) (stating that 
naming rights are only an incidental or tenuous benefit for purposes of determining self-
dealing in the private foundation context); Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 105 (1968) (“[s]uch 
privileges as being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are 
not significant return benefits that have a monetary value”). 
61 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (exhibiting that the Service generally finds 
intangible benefits insufficient to defeat a charitable contribution). 
62 See I.R.C. § 102 (2012) (explaining the general rule for gifts). 
63 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (outlining what may be considered 
a gift and potential consequences for charitable organizations). 
64 436 F.2d 1327, 1328 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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corruption in Louisiana was hurting the business climate.65  The Service 
contended that the payments were gifts because Stern received nothing 
of value in exchange for the contribution.66  The court sided with Stern, 
finding the expenditures were ordinary and necessary business expenses 
lacking donative intent, and were designed to protect Stern’s business 
interests.67  This holding saved Stern from gift tax, but it might have 
subjected the receiving organization to tax, if it were not tax exempt.68  
Although the test in the gift tax and income tax context are different, 
receipt of a tangible benefit defeats gift tax treatment in the income tax 
context because the payment is then not given with detached and 
disinterested generosity.69 
The next question is whether the gift is subject to gift tax.  Gift tax is 
generally owed on transfers that were not made for “money or money’s 
worth”70  There is a yearly gift tax exemption amount, now set at 
$14,000.71  It is highly questionable, however, whether this exemption 
amount would apply to donations to taxable corporations.72 
The Service’s position with regard to gift treatment in situations like 
this is no longer clear.  The Services’s position was that these types of 
contributions were gifts for both gift tax and income tax purposes, but it 
may be backing away from this treatment.73  Treating contributions to an 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1329. 
67 Id. at 1328–29. 
68 Id. at 1330. 
69 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (explaining whether a payment is a 
contribution or gift). 
70 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (2013) (providing there is a gift when “the value of 
property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the 
consideration given”). 
71 Rev. Proc. 2012-41, Treas. Reg. § 601.602, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/RP-12-41.pdf, archived at perma.cc/L688-XSWV. 
72 See BRANT J. HELLWIG & ROBERT T. DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 75–76 
(2011) (treating contributions to corporations as contributions to its members for purposes 
of the gift tax exclusion).  This is considered a contribution of a future interest and the 
annual exclusion is therefore not available.  See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (providing 
an exception to donations to political organizations, but political organizations in that 
context likely refer to political organizations under § 527, which are now specifically 
exempted from the gift tax). 
73 See Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) 
Organizations:  Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2012) (discussing the Service’s Exempt Organizations 
division’s ignorance when asked whether “[d]onations to 501(c)(4) organizations are 
taxable gifts”); Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities, supra note 9, at 70 (discussing the 
Service’s position on the gift tax provision as it relates to political organizations); Donald B. 
Tobin, The Application of the Gift Tax Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code to § 501(c)(4) 
Organizations, ELECTIONLAW@MORITZ (2011), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/ 
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organization as gifts would have likely led to the conclusion that 
contributions to social welfare organizations were subject to gift tax.74  
After pressure from Republican Senators, the Service announced that it 
was examining the issue and any action to enforce the gift tax would 
only be prospective.75  If a gift to social welfare organizations is not 
subject to gift tax, then similar logic should apply to gifts to taxable 
organizations. 
IV.  GAMES WE PLAY 
With these tax concepts in mind, the new loophole can be exploited.  
A taxable organization has two possible avenues for obtaining funds for 
its organization without having to include those funds in income for 
income tax purposes.  First, it can seek very large contributions, 
classifying them as contributions to capital.  It can either argue that these 
are non-shareholder contributions to capital or it can provide some 
ownership or other rights to the contributor in exchange for the 
contribution.  If the contributions are contributions to capital, the taxable 
organization will have no income tax liability from the payments. 
Alternatively, the organization can argue that the contributions are 
gifts.  The donor has provided a gift to the organization in the same 
manner that donors make contributions to charities, educational 
institutions, and other political organizations.  As such, the entity will 
                                                                                                             
article/?article=8335, archived at http://perma.cc/7WRD-X5J8 (explaining that the Service 
has indicated contributions are subject to gift tax). 
74 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (identifying theories of social welfare 
organizations being subject to gift tax). 
75 See Orrin G. Hatch, Jon Kyl, Pat Roberts, John Cornyn, John Thune & Richard Burr, 
Senators to IRS:  Questions Raised by Agency’s Recent Actions into Gift Tax Enforcement; 
Concern about Political Influence, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=ec29441e-aefd-4192-a62 
8-d96966cf4231, archived at http://perma.cc/5HAW-4L6Q (detailing several senators’ 
request to the Service for names of individuals who made the decision to enforce the 
provision, correspondence between the Service’s employees, Treasury, and the White 
House on the issue, and any analysis generated by the Service regarding First Amendment 
issues related to the collection); Steven T. Miller, Memorandum for Commissioner, Small 
Business/Self-Employed Division Commissioner, Tax-exempt and Government Entities Division, 
DEP’T. TREAS. (July 7, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/guidance_for_irs_sbse_ 
estate_and_gift_tax_and_tege_exempt_organizations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
ZJE6-XPXL (providing guidance for small business and self-employed estate and gift tax); 
Letter from Marcus Owens to Emily S. McMahon, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dept. Treas. 
(Aug. 8, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/McMahonletter.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RH7-7C6Z (criticizing the Service’s lack of guidance concerning gift tax 
and charitable organizations); Donald B. Tobin, Is Congress Politicizing the IRS and Its Tax 
Enforcement Process?, TAX ANALYSTS (Aug. 22, 2011),  http://taxprof.typepad.com/ 
files/132tn0853.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ET9A-EVGS (discussing the Service’s 
announcement that it is re-examining its policies). 
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argue the donations are not income for tax purposes.  If these payments 
are gifts, there is a risk they would be subject to gift tax.  Donors could 
then argue that, just like donations to social welfare groups, donations to 
taxable entities should not be subject to gift tax.76  Organizations 
following this path are organized as taxable entities but would have little 
to no tax bill because they would have little to no income.  Since these 
organizations are not tax-exempt, they would not have any obligation to 
file disclosure returns with the Service nor would they be required to file 
with the Service seeking recognition.  If they were corporations, they 
would have to file as a state corporation, but little other disclosure would 
be required.77 If the corporation engaged in electioneering 
communication or express advocacy it would have to disclose those 
expenditures, but it would likely not have to disclose its donors.78  
Taxable entities would still be required to file a tax return with the 
Service, but those returns would be subject to privacy protections under 
section 6103 of the Code.  Moreover, these taxable organizations would 
be subject to review only if the Service chose to audit the returns. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Lecture discusses the possible next frontier for organizations 
seeking to avoid donor disclosure.  If Congress, the Treasury, or the 
Service successfully reforms the current structure to ensure donor 
disclosure by tax-exempt groups, IGs may simply reorganize as taxable 
entities and seek ways to limit their tax liability.  The Service should set 
out clear guidance regarding whether contributions I have described 
here are contributions to capital, and whether payments could be 
considered gifts for gift and income tax purposes.  The Service needs to 
provide guidance in this area before taxable entities become the next 
campaign vehicle of choice.  Guidance could be given today in a 
nonpolitically charged environment before a particular party or entity is 
identified with this loophole.  Once politically charged organizations 
start using the loophole, guidance will become more difficult.  Congress 
and the Service can plug this hole before it leaks. 
                                                 
76 I have argued elsewhere that donations to social welfare organizations are subject to 
gift tax.  The analysis here with regard to taxable entities highlights why gift tax treatment 
is appropriate under current law in the social welfare context.  Political Advocacy and Taxable 
Entities, supra note 9, at 70. 
77 While outside the scope of this Lecture, the corporation could likely organize as either 
a nonprofit corporation or as a public benefit corporation under state law.  An entity could 
also organize as a limited liability company and then elect to be taxed as a corporation. 
78 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing required disclosure of 
expenditures related to electioneering communications). 
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